"& no man putteth new wine into old bottles: else the new wine doth burst the bottles, & the wine is spilled, & the bottles will be marred: but new wine must be put into new bottles."
- Mark 2.22
This could be a rationalisation for indulging a taste for stationery that is more expensive, BUT:
Do you think the quality of the notebook actually affects the quality of the thoughts put in it ? Will a cheaper notebook worsen my thoughts ?
On the face of it, this seems crazy, but the reason I ask is because I filled my last good quality notebook recently, & went on to a cheaper one because it was what I had to hand.
Despite only just having started using the cheaper one, I felt impelled to buy a new better one, prompted by the - superstition ? - I mentioned above.
Does the quality of the container affect the liquid put in it ?
Well, in the case of making wine, sherry or whisky, most definitely. People who make those drinks go to great lengths to secure exactly the right barrels for their particular process.
I do realise though that an analogy is not a proof.
Friday 30 September 2011
Wednesday 28 September 2011
Steve Richards Bang On the Money
This is transcribed from television, specifically The Daily Politics Conference Special, 27.9.11. I wanted to preserve it because Steve Richards makes a point which is absolutely spot on.
The context: Andrew Neil, Danny Finkelstein & Steve Richards are discussing the Labour Party Conference so far, just before Ed M was going to give his Leader's speech; the pre-match build up. At the end of their discussion they start talking about the fact that up to now, as far as they are aware, neither Tony Blair nor Gordon Brown has been mentioned in any of the major speeches.
Steve Richards then says the following (when he says they're he means the current leadership of the Labour Party) -
Steve Richards: The Blair & Brown absence I think explains partly why they're all so bewildered. There were these two figures who dominated everthing in this Party for more than a decade ....
Andrew Neil: Since 1994 onwards !
Steve Richards: Since '94 onwards. And so what we're seeing really are sort of half-formed politicians stifled by that duopoly having to learn Politics in the full glare of scrutiny now.
The context: Andrew Neil, Danny Finkelstein & Steve Richards are discussing the Labour Party Conference so far, just before Ed M was going to give his Leader's speech; the pre-match build up. At the end of their discussion they start talking about the fact that up to now, as far as they are aware, neither Tony Blair nor Gordon Brown has been mentioned in any of the major speeches.
Steve Richards then says the following (when he says they're he means the current leadership of the Labour Party) -
Steve Richards: The Blair & Brown absence I think explains partly why they're all so bewildered. There were these two figures who dominated everthing in this Party for more than a decade ....
Andrew Neil: Since 1994 onwards !
Steve Richards: Since '94 onwards. And so what we're seeing really are sort of half-formed politicians stifled by that duopoly having to learn Politics in the full glare of scrutiny now.
Monday 26 September 2011
Against Melanie Phillips
I read Melanie Phillip's latest blog post last night, about the speeches of Abbas & Netanyahu at the UN General Assembly. It is called Truth & Lies at the Theatre of the Absurd. (You can find the piece itself here: http://melaniephillips.com/truth-and-lies-at-the-theatre-of-the-absurd N.B. it is on that page, you need to scroll down a bit to find it.)
There was a particular sentence, a particular assertion, which really bothered me, & I spent a little time quoting it & arguing against it on Twitter. It is this:
"As certain Palestinian spokesmen themselves have acknowledged, Palestinian identity was itself constructed purely to destroy Israel."
I was & am completely nonplussed by this statement. I am at a loss how any intelligent adult could propose it seriously. It has continued to bother me overnight, so here are a few thoughts about that statement, the blog post as a whole, & Melanie Phillips' style of argument in general.
Her logic & tone remind me of a hard-core Unionist in Northern Ireland in the 1970s & '80s, reacting to the IRA and Republicanism generally, conflating them as the same thing. The essence of their position could be put something like this:
"These people are terrorists, seeking our destruction. You don't accommodate terrorists, you fight them."
This is a recipe for never-ending conflict.
I wonder if one reason she puts forward such extreme, and sometimes frankly nonsensical, ideas is that she wants to avoid, to shut down, discussion; because such sentiments as the one she wrote that I quoted at the start make discussion impossible.
Nonsense has a certain power, because it cannot be refuted.
This is true of many, perhaps most, (but not all) conspiracy theories. The problem with conspiracy theories is distinguishing between those that refer to genuine conspiracies, & those that are fanciful. Not all conspiracy theories are nonsense, people do sometimes conspire. To take a random example, MI6 & the CIA, with the knowledge & approval of Churchill & Eisenhower, did indeed conspire to overthrow the government of Mohammad Mosadegh in Iran in 1953, & succeeded. This is not my opinion, or suspicion; it is a fact, a matter of record.
In the second part of Melanie's sentence I quoted at the start, she presents what is her opinion as if it were a fact. Rather, it is just sheer assertion. I note that the certain Palestinian spokesmen in the first part of the sentence are not named or identified further, nor is there any source given for their remarkable opinion. As evidence of the truth of the second part, the first part is worthless. I'm embarrassed for her, pointing out such obvious flaws. A clever child could spot them.
Often for me with Melanie's arguments, it is like trying to persuade someone of the following: that 2 + 2 = 4 is an inarguable reality; whereas 2 + 3 = 4 is an opinion, not a fact, & does not have equal weight with a proposition that is true.
Not all claims are true.
I have a bad feeling too that Melanie is one of those people who take disagreement, in this case coming from a left-wing source like me, as automatic confirmation that they are right. This is another way in which it is impossible to argue productively with them.
It should be noted that I am not putting these points forward because I disagree with Melanie politically, which I do. They would bother me just the same way from anyone, anyone who took any position.
I completely recognise that the Israeli Government has legitimate security concerns which need to be addressed in any peace negotiations in order to protect its people. I think though that by muddling opinion and fact so badly, in a perverse sense Melanie Phillips is no friend of Israel, defending that State in such a shoddy way.
There was a particular sentence, a particular assertion, which really bothered me, & I spent a little time quoting it & arguing against it on Twitter. It is this:
"As certain Palestinian spokesmen themselves have acknowledged, Palestinian identity was itself constructed purely to destroy Israel."
I was & am completely nonplussed by this statement. I am at a loss how any intelligent adult could propose it seriously. It has continued to bother me overnight, so here are a few thoughts about that statement, the blog post as a whole, & Melanie Phillips' style of argument in general.
Her logic & tone remind me of a hard-core Unionist in Northern Ireland in the 1970s & '80s, reacting to the IRA and Republicanism generally, conflating them as the same thing. The essence of their position could be put something like this:
"These people are terrorists, seeking our destruction. You don't accommodate terrorists, you fight them."
This is a recipe for never-ending conflict.
I wonder if one reason she puts forward such extreme, and sometimes frankly nonsensical, ideas is that she wants to avoid, to shut down, discussion; because such sentiments as the one she wrote that I quoted at the start make discussion impossible.
Nonsense has a certain power, because it cannot be refuted.
This is true of many, perhaps most, (but not all) conspiracy theories. The problem with conspiracy theories is distinguishing between those that refer to genuine conspiracies, & those that are fanciful. Not all conspiracy theories are nonsense, people do sometimes conspire. To take a random example, MI6 & the CIA, with the knowledge & approval of Churchill & Eisenhower, did indeed conspire to overthrow the government of Mohammad Mosadegh in Iran in 1953, & succeeded. This is not my opinion, or suspicion; it is a fact, a matter of record.
In the second part of Melanie's sentence I quoted at the start, she presents what is her opinion as if it were a fact. Rather, it is just sheer assertion. I note that the certain Palestinian spokesmen in the first part of the sentence are not named or identified further, nor is there any source given for their remarkable opinion. As evidence of the truth of the second part, the first part is worthless. I'm embarrassed for her, pointing out such obvious flaws. A clever child could spot them.
Often for me with Melanie's arguments, it is like trying to persuade someone of the following: that 2 + 2 = 4 is an inarguable reality; whereas 2 + 3 = 4 is an opinion, not a fact, & does not have equal weight with a proposition that is true.
Not all claims are true.
I have a bad feeling too that Melanie is one of those people who take disagreement, in this case coming from a left-wing source like me, as automatic confirmation that they are right. This is another way in which it is impossible to argue productively with them.
It should be noted that I am not putting these points forward because I disagree with Melanie politically, which I do. They would bother me just the same way from anyone, anyone who took any position.
I completely recognise that the Israeli Government has legitimate security concerns which need to be addressed in any peace negotiations in order to protect its people. I think though that by muddling opinion and fact so badly, in a perverse sense Melanie Phillips is no friend of Israel, defending that State in such a shoddy way.
Wednesday 21 September 2011
Prospects for the LibDems
"Macbeth: They have tied me to a stake: I cannot fly,
But, bear-like, I must fight the course ..."
- 'Macbeth' 5.7.1-2
(The difference between Macbeth and the LibDems at the moment though being that the latter have tied themselves to the stake; otherwise the logic is the same.)
The LibDems have nowhere to go, they have to stick with the Coalition. Their calculation - one born of despair, really - is that if the economy comes good by 2015, the planned time of the next General Election, that will justify their entering the Coalition (their narrative of acting in The National Interest), and they will benefit electorally from it.
At the moment their support has at least halved from what it was at the last General Election, from 26% then to in the range 11-13% now.
I think their calculation is wrong. If the economy does come right, or at least improve, by 2015, then the Tories will benefit and win outright. If it does not, Labour will win outright.
I make this prediction barring unforeseen political earthquakes (which is of course a complete get-out clause for me !)
I also present this with a caveat about my record as a political forecaster. I didn't foresee the Coalition. What I was expecting & predicting would happen at the last Election was as follows: I thought that the Tories would get more votes than anyone else, but not enough for an outright majority (I got that right at least). What I expected to happen next though was that they would form a minority Government which would last 6 months, be unable to enact its Budget, and fall on a no-confidence vote in the Autumn. In the meantime, Gordon Brown would have resigned and David Miliband would have become Labour leader. There would be another General Election in November, after which the LibDems would go into coalition with Labour.
So that shows how much my predictions are to be relied on. It should be noted that what I anticipated would happen was also what I wanted to happen.
One final thought, prompted by watching the LibDem Conference and thinking about their future: Politics is a blood sport.
But, bear-like, I must fight the course ..."
- 'Macbeth' 5.7.1-2
(The difference between Macbeth and the LibDems at the moment though being that the latter have tied themselves to the stake; otherwise the logic is the same.)
The LibDems have nowhere to go, they have to stick with the Coalition. Their calculation - one born of despair, really - is that if the economy comes good by 2015, the planned time of the next General Election, that will justify their entering the Coalition (their narrative of acting in The National Interest), and they will benefit electorally from it.
At the moment their support has at least halved from what it was at the last General Election, from 26% then to in the range 11-13% now.
I think their calculation is wrong. If the economy does come right, or at least improve, by 2015, then the Tories will benefit and win outright. If it does not, Labour will win outright.
I make this prediction barring unforeseen political earthquakes (which is of course a complete get-out clause for me !)
I also present this with a caveat about my record as a political forecaster. I didn't foresee the Coalition. What I was expecting & predicting would happen at the last Election was as follows: I thought that the Tories would get more votes than anyone else, but not enough for an outright majority (I got that right at least). What I expected to happen next though was that they would form a minority Government which would last 6 months, be unable to enact its Budget, and fall on a no-confidence vote in the Autumn. In the meantime, Gordon Brown would have resigned and David Miliband would have become Labour leader. There would be another General Election in November, after which the LibDems would go into coalition with Labour.
So that shows how much my predictions are to be relied on. It should be noted that what I anticipated would happen was also what I wanted to happen.
One final thought, prompted by watching the LibDem Conference and thinking about their future: Politics is a blood sport.
Saturday 17 September 2011
Macaulay at full throttle on Machiavelli
This is not a blog post, it is just a piece of fun, a quote which is too long for Twitter. It is by Lord Macaulay, giving it both barrels, from near the start of his essay 'Machiavelli', written in March, 1827.
"It is indeed scarcely possible for any person, not well acquainted with the history and literature of Italy, to read without horror and amazement the celebrated treatise which has brought so much obloquy on the name of Machiavelli. Such a display of wickedness, naked yet not ashamed, such cool, judicious, scientific atrocity, seemed rather to belong to a fiend than to the most depraved of men. Principles which the most hardened ruffian would scarcely hint to his most trusted accomplice, or avow, without the disguise of some palliating sophism, even to his own mind, are professed without the slightest circumlocution, and assumed as the fundamental axioms of all political science."
'Obloquy', 'hardened ruffian', above all 'palliating sophism' ! Outstanding stuff. Macaulay goes on to explain that in his view, this commonly held opinion of Machiavelli is far too simplistic. I could quote from this essay more or less forever. I recommend the whole piece very much indeed.
"It is indeed scarcely possible for any person, not well acquainted with the history and literature of Italy, to read without horror and amazement the celebrated treatise which has brought so much obloquy on the name of Machiavelli. Such a display of wickedness, naked yet not ashamed, such cool, judicious, scientific atrocity, seemed rather to belong to a fiend than to the most depraved of men. Principles which the most hardened ruffian would scarcely hint to his most trusted accomplice, or avow, without the disguise of some palliating sophism, even to his own mind, are professed without the slightest circumlocution, and assumed as the fundamental axioms of all political science."
'Obloquy', 'hardened ruffian', above all 'palliating sophism' ! Outstanding stuff. Macaulay goes on to explain that in his view, this commonly held opinion of Machiavelli is far too simplistic. I could quote from this essay more or less forever. I recommend the whole piece very much indeed.
Thursday 15 September 2011
The Hari Affair
After months of suspense, now we know the full extent of what Johann Hari is admitting to, and it is very serious indeed. (http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/johann-hari/johann-hari-a-personal-apology-2354679.html)
Firstly, there is inserting material silently from the books of people he was interviewing, in place of what they said in the actual interview. This is wrong but not appalling. I am puzzled as to why he didn't simply insert the material from elsewhere and just cite its origin.
Then there is the inserting in his published interviews of material from interviews done by other journalists without attribution. In other words, plagiarism. It is distinct from the practice described above, and inexcusable. With or without journalistic training. it is hard to understand how Hari thought this was an acceptable thing to do.
The final admission is by far the most serious. It is that he created a fictitious online identity - using a name which happens to be that of a Times journalist working at the moment, David Rose, with whom Hari went to university - with which he maliciously re-edited the wikipedia entires of 'people I had clashed with', as he puts it. This was done secretly, and more than once. It was not an isolated incident, not merely a single moment of anger or foolishness.
The allegation that he had done this has been around for some time. At first glance it seemed absurd: what could possess someone to do such a thing ? It is so childish - 'juvenile', as Hari himself writes. The gain is nothing, and the potential loss of reputation if discovered so immense. There are people online with the skills and patience to unmask anyone doing it, despite any attempt at concealment. A key point of the whole affair, and Hari admits something along these lines in his apology, is that if a right-wing journalist or commentator had done what Hari has done, he would have attacked them strongly for it, and with relish.
The Independent are backing Hari and he continues to be employed by them. The question for me is: whatever article he writes next, how will anyone take it seriously ? Will it not be greeted with derision ?
Finally, Hari refers in his apology to 'the most basic ethical rule: don't do to others what you don't want them to do to you.' That seems to me so tortuous a way of putting it that the meaning almost disappears. Here's a simpler way: 'Do as you would be done by.'
ADDENDUM: On reflection, I find Hari's apology even less satisfactory than I did at first, and am surprised that The Independent printed it as it is, or thought it was sufficient.
The only motive for silently inserting quotes from books by his interviewees in his finished pieces is to make his interviews seem better than they were. The reason Hari gives is a transparently inadequate rationalisation.
His defence that because he lacks proper journalistic training, he didn't realise plagiarism was wrong is absurd.
If you notice, the apology constantly seeks to minimise the offences by being deliberately vague about details. With each of the three misdemeanours, it is important to know the extent of it in order to judge its seriousness. In each case, how many times did he do it exactly, and over what period ? For instance, with the wiki-trolling: who precisely were the targets ? How many times did he interfere with their pages ? What alterations did he make ? Over what period of time did he do it ? Accurate answers to those questions are vital for the reader to determine his or her opinion of what took place.
All in all, Hari is trying to apologise without really doing so, and for some reason The Independent has allowed him to do it. Regarding either Hari or the paper, it won't do.
(By far the best reaction to all this I have seen is by Bagehot for The Economist: http://www.economist.com/blogs/bagehot/2011/09/unethical-journalism )
Wednesday 14 September 2011
Why do the Unions go on funding Labour when the Party doesn't do exactly what they want ?
Tories love to taunt the Labour Party by saying that it is in hock to the Trade Unions. A more complicated version of this is to say that Labour is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Unions. But the people making these taunts know that they are not true. It is true that about 87% of Labour's funding does come from the Trade Unions (source: http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/may/25/labour-party-donors-unions). But Ed Miliband refused to back the strike action taken by four Unions in June this year, and reiterated that refusal in his speech to the TUC Congress yesterday, a position that was greeted by boos and heckling.
So given that the Unions are overwhelmingly Labour's main source of funding, why won't the leader of that party do exactly what they want, and why do they put up with it and go on funding the Party ?
The answers come if you consider their alternative. They are free to withdraw funding and therefore bankrupt and destroy Labour, and set up their own new Party whose policies would be under their complete control. The problem is, no one would vote for it, and they know this. Labour may not give the Unions everything they want, but they are a viable political party with a network of activists, historical roots and a base of support in the country, which can and have been translated into becoming the Government. Ed Miliband, or any Labour leader, may appear to hold a weak hand because of Labour's financial dependence on the Unions; but on the other hand he knows, and the Union leaders know, that the Labour Party is the best offer they are ever going to get in terms of meaningful access to power, and that effectively the Unions have nowhere else to go.
This explains what is otherwise a puzzle: why the Unions would go on supporting a Labour leader they were primarily responsible for installing who does not support them on strikes over what they regard as critical issues for their membership; and why they would go on funding the Party of which he is a head.
So given that the Unions are overwhelmingly Labour's main source of funding, why won't the leader of that party do exactly what they want, and why do they put up with it and go on funding the Party ?
The answers come if you consider their alternative. They are free to withdraw funding and therefore bankrupt and destroy Labour, and set up their own new Party whose policies would be under their complete control. The problem is, no one would vote for it, and they know this. Labour may not give the Unions everything they want, but they are a viable political party with a network of activists, historical roots and a base of support in the country, which can and have been translated into becoming the Government. Ed Miliband, or any Labour leader, may appear to hold a weak hand because of Labour's financial dependence on the Unions; but on the other hand he knows, and the Union leaders know, that the Labour Party is the best offer they are ever going to get in terms of meaningful access to power, and that effectively the Unions have nowhere else to go.
This explains what is otherwise a puzzle: why the Unions would go on supporting a Labour leader they were primarily responsible for installing who does not support them on strikes over what they regard as critical issues for their membership; and why they would go on funding the Party of which he is a head.
Monday 12 September 2011
Invasion of Iraq 2003: A Hideous Mistake
"SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Was it then a weakness in the pre-March 2003 discussions that somehow voices weren't raised, and experts and knowledge weren't put on the table that there could be this massive deterioration [in the security situation in Iraq post-invasion] ?
RT HON TONY BLAIR: There was very much discussion of the Shia/Sunni issue, and we were very well aware of that. What there wasn't -- and this, again, is of vital importance and this certainly is a lesson in any situation similar to this -- people did not believe that you would have Al-Qaeda coming in from outside and people did not believe that you would end up in a situation where Iran, once, as it were, the threat of Saddam was removed from them, would then try to deliberately destabilise the country, but that's what they did, and there are some very important lessons in that ... "
- Tony Blair giving evidence at The Chilcot Enquiry, 29th January 2010, p.194 (http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/transcripts/oralevidence-bydate/100129.aspx)
"I mean the truth is what got really difficult, far more difficult than anyone imagined, was when you got external factors joining up with internal factors to try and cause chaos and instability; by use of terrorism, by suicide bombers, by, you know, roadside bombs ..."
- Tony Blair, referring to both Iraq & Afghanistan, interview for The Times, 9th September 2011, by Philip Webster & Richard Beeston (http://www.tonyblairoffice.org/news/entry/ten-years-after-9-11-the-battle-is-for-an-open-world-not-a-closed-one/)
How governments are run, whether in theory (the constitution) or practice (the given particular administration) may seem a tiresome detail of interest only to political nerds and policy wonks. But in fact it is vital because how decisions are made crucially shapes what decisions are made, and those decisions often have very wide consequences. The decision by the US and UK Governments , with support from only Australia and Poland, to invade Iraq in 2003 is a perfect illustration of this point.
In the events running up to the invasion of Iraq, one critical similarity between Tony Blair's government and the Bush Administration is that they were both run by tight cabals who were contemptuous of disagreement within their own wider governments. This was a key structural feature, in fact a weakness, in both governments which first made the decision to invade possible, and second for it to happen without any adequate plans for the aftermath. Dissent was marginalised; caveats and those raising them excluded. Furthermore, Blair's cabal was contemptuous of public opinion in Britain, which was generally at best puzzled by the need for or at worst actively hostile to the invasion. The Bush cabal meanwhile were contemptuous of international opinion.
Invading Iraq at all was a dumb decision. But the error was compounded a thousandfold by the incredible incompetence of how it was carried out, particularly the complete failure to plan properly or at all for what would happen once Saddam's forces had been defeated. Their planning did not go beyond 'We'll go in there with overwhelming force, we'll knock Saddam over, then everything will be alright.'
Tony Blair's contention, made in his evidence to the Chilcot Enquiry in 2010, that: a) everything would have been alright but for the interference of Al-Qaeda and more especially Iran; and b) that interference could not have been foreseen, are both ludicrous coming from an intelligent man. Such feeble reasoning merely highlights how indefensible the invasion was. I found it staggering in 2010, and do so now reading over it again, that Tony Blair was not ashamed publicly to reveal such a flawed and limitted understanding of the country he was proposing to invade, and of the dynamics of the region. He was the Prime Mininster of the United Kingdom. He cannot have lacked for experts. One can only presume he was not listening to them.No one knows or will ever know the number of Iraqis who have died in the internal conflicts since the invasion of 2003. Estimates, which is all there are, vary greatly. You can see some for yourself here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualties_of_the_Iraq_War. It is reasonable to say it is more than 100,000 people. The fact that we don't know is a kind of extra injury to the people of Iraq, and emphasises our recklessness in that country.
"I also think however that in the action in Libya we're able to learn from the experiences particularly in nation building in Afghanistan & Iraq, but we've also got to hope by the way that in Libya you don't get the same external forces as you got in Iraq particularly, and in Afghanistan, destabilising the situation. Now personally I'm pretty optimistic about that, I think there's every chance Libya will get on its feet, and that would be great ..."
- Tony Blair, 'The 9/11 Interview', with Jon Sopel, BBCNews, 10th September, 2011 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-14864513)
There is a constant implication in Tony Blair's remarks about the invasion of Iraq that I find infuriating. It is that the invasion itself took place in a kind of historical vacuum, in which none of what eventually happened could have been foreseen. In essence, saying that there had never been such a thing as a counter-insurgency campaign before and therefore there were no precedents or experience to help the invaders anticipate what might happen, they had to start from scratch. This is so obviously wrong that it is insulting, somewhat like Gordon Brown's claim that the banking disaster and credit crunch of 2007-8 came from nowhere and could not have been predicted. You have to have effectively no knowledge in order to believe either.
Here are a very few major counter-insurgencies that were available to serve as potential models, and provide warning of pitfalls:
British:
1. Malayan Emergency 1948-60
2. Aden Emergency 1963-67
3. Mau Mau Rebellion (Kenya) 1952-60, though this was a brutal & disgraceful campaign on our part.
4. EOKA in Cyprus 1955-9
French:
1. Indochina 1946-54
RT HON TONY BLAIR: There was very much discussion of the Shia/Sunni issue, and we were very well aware of that. What there wasn't -- and this, again, is of vital importance and this certainly is a lesson in any situation similar to this -- people did not believe that you would have Al-Qaeda coming in from outside and people did not believe that you would end up in a situation where Iran, once, as it were, the threat of Saddam was removed from them, would then try to deliberately destabilise the country, but that's what they did, and there are some very important lessons in that ... "
- Tony Blair giving evidence at The Chilcot Enquiry, 29th January 2010, p.194 (http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/transcripts/oralevidence-bydate/100129.aspx)
"I mean the truth is what got really difficult, far more difficult than anyone imagined, was when you got external factors joining up with internal factors to try and cause chaos and instability; by use of terrorism, by suicide bombers, by, you know, roadside bombs ..."
- Tony Blair, referring to both Iraq & Afghanistan, interview for The Times, 9th September 2011, by Philip Webster & Richard Beeston (http://www.tonyblairoffice.org/news/entry/ten-years-after-9-11-the-battle-is-for-an-open-world-not-a-closed-one/)
How governments are run, whether in theory (the constitution) or practice (the given particular administration) may seem a tiresome detail of interest only to political nerds and policy wonks. But in fact it is vital because how decisions are made crucially shapes what decisions are made, and those decisions often have very wide consequences. The decision by the US and UK Governments , with support from only Australia and Poland, to invade Iraq in 2003 is a perfect illustration of this point.
In the events running up to the invasion of Iraq, one critical similarity between Tony Blair's government and the Bush Administration is that they were both run by tight cabals who were contemptuous of disagreement within their own wider governments. This was a key structural feature, in fact a weakness, in both governments which first made the decision to invade possible, and second for it to happen without any adequate plans for the aftermath. Dissent was marginalised; caveats and those raising them excluded. Furthermore, Blair's cabal was contemptuous of public opinion in Britain, which was generally at best puzzled by the need for or at worst actively hostile to the invasion. The Bush cabal meanwhile were contemptuous of international opinion.
Invading Iraq at all was a dumb decision. But the error was compounded a thousandfold by the incredible incompetence of how it was carried out, particularly the complete failure to plan properly or at all for what would happen once Saddam's forces had been defeated. Their planning did not go beyond 'We'll go in there with overwhelming force, we'll knock Saddam over, then everything will be alright.'
Tony Blair's contention, made in his evidence to the Chilcot Enquiry in 2010, that: a) everything would have been alright but for the interference of Al-Qaeda and more especially Iran; and b) that interference could not have been foreseen, are both ludicrous coming from an intelligent man. Such feeble reasoning merely highlights how indefensible the invasion was. I found it staggering in 2010, and do so now reading over it again, that Tony Blair was not ashamed publicly to reveal such a flawed and limitted understanding of the country he was proposing to invade, and of the dynamics of the region. He was the Prime Mininster of the United Kingdom. He cannot have lacked for experts. One can only presume he was not listening to them.No one knows or will ever know the number of Iraqis who have died in the internal conflicts since the invasion of 2003. Estimates, which is all there are, vary greatly. You can see some for yourself here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualties_of_the_Iraq_War. It is reasonable to say it is more than 100,000 people. The fact that we don't know is a kind of extra injury to the people of Iraq, and emphasises our recklessness in that country.
"I also think however that in the action in Libya we're able to learn from the experiences particularly in nation building in Afghanistan & Iraq, but we've also got to hope by the way that in Libya you don't get the same external forces as you got in Iraq particularly, and in Afghanistan, destabilising the situation. Now personally I'm pretty optimistic about that, I think there's every chance Libya will get on its feet, and that would be great ..."
- Tony Blair, 'The 9/11 Interview', with Jon Sopel, BBCNews, 10th September, 2011 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-14864513)
There is a constant implication in Tony Blair's remarks about the invasion of Iraq that I find infuriating. It is that the invasion itself took place in a kind of historical vacuum, in which none of what eventually happened could have been foreseen. In essence, saying that there had never been such a thing as a counter-insurgency campaign before and therefore there were no precedents or experience to help the invaders anticipate what might happen, they had to start from scratch. This is so obviously wrong that it is insulting, somewhat like Gordon Brown's claim that the banking disaster and credit crunch of 2007-8 came from nowhere and could not have been predicted. You have to have effectively no knowledge in order to believe either.
Here are a very few major counter-insurgencies that were available to serve as potential models, and provide warning of pitfalls:
British:
1. Malayan Emergency 1948-60
2. Aden Emergency 1963-67
3. Mau Mau Rebellion (Kenya) 1952-60, though this was a brutal & disgraceful campaign on our part.
4. EOKA in Cyprus 1955-9
French:
1. Indochina 1946-54
2. Algeria 1954-62
That's just for 2 countries fighting them in only a 20 year period and post-WWII. I'm labouring the point. There are innumerable examples. A two minute search on Google using the term 'Counter-insurgency' will start you off and direct you to all you need to know.
That's just for 2 countries fighting them in only a 20 year period and post-WWII. I'm labouring the point. There are innumerable examples. A two minute search on Google using the term 'Counter-insurgency' will start you off and direct you to all you need to know.
Tuesday 6 September 2011
Come Back, David Miliband !
I have been extremely critical of David Miliband in the past, when he was a front-line politician in the last Brown Government, and widely regarded as the most likely next Labour leader. There was no question of his ability, either as a Minister or as a politician, but I found him far too smooth. He seemed to me the most successful of all the aspiring imitators of Tony Blair - Nick Clegg & David Cameron being among the others - with everything sinister that implies; for instance very powerful and infectious self-belief, the ability to persuade colleagues & voters to back highly dubious proposals. I found his ambition disturbing because it was so naked. Again like Tony Blair, he seemed to have a lust for power, a lust that if fulfilled would provide external confirmation of what he knew inside already all along, that he was right.
Now though I find my opinion of David Miliband has modified, and for the following reason: what he has not done since losing the Labour leadership election. Now, a majority of voters in the Labour leadership contest did what members of Parties often do when they have just suffered a bruising defeat and been turfed out of office after a long spell in it. They elect a leader who suits them, who they feel comfortable with (in this case Ed M), not the one who would most effectively make their case to the wider electorate (here, David M). This is because the latter kind of leader is necessarily suspect to them; because that leader by definition has a wider view of things than the majority of his party members; in the case of the Labour Party, he or she would be 'too right-wing'. Remember how the Tories elected that succession of no-hopers after John Major, their very own Brezhnev-Andropov-Chernenko sequence. I've had to look up what exact order they came in to make sure, but in a sense it doesn't really matter: William Hague, Iain Duncan Smith for heaven's sake !, Michael Howard. This is the same process at work. These leaders were sufficiently right-wing to suit the taste of the Party and activists, but too right-wing for the electorate at large.
Now Ed Miliband, after a stumbling start, is turning out to be a better leader of Labour than I had anticipated. I think he still has great difficulty coming over naturally in tv interviews. But it is not Ed I am concerned with here, it is David.
Think what has not happened since the outcome of the leadership election. There have been no stories of splits or tension or disagreement over policy between David and Ed. There has been no sniping at Ed, no critical running commentary, no secret hostile briefing to journalists from himself or from 'friends'. David retired from the front-line with the professed aim of avoiding stories of splits, and as it turns out has really done so. He has kept his own counsel, and been prepared to let Ed make his own way unhindered. Now - think of the amount of mischief David could have caused if he had wanted to, the civil war he could at least have tried to ignite, based on pique and wounded vanity; motives common in political disputes. That he has not done so is to me testament to his restraint. I infer that he has not done so from the absence of stories of conflict he could have generated had he wished, in a media only too eager to receive and amplify them.
Which all leads me to a position I never thought I would hold. What I would like to see is David Miliband returning to front-line politics. Why ? Because he knows what he's on about when it comes to foreign affairs. At this time of great turmoil abroad, especially in the Middle East and North Africa, where our interests and sympathies are involved and we face all sorts of choices and temptations over if and how to intervene (or put negatively to meddle), we need his voice, his expertise, his advice.
I think the recent check in his career has done David M good. It is in times of adversity and enforced silence that true character is both developed and shown. Think of Teddy Roosevelt in the Dakota Territory after his wife and mother died, or Churchill in his wilderness years. Lofty comparisons perhaps, but something akin to what David is undergoing now; his forty days and nights in the Desert.
One thing David may wish to contemplate during this time is his alleged complicity in Extraordinary Rendition while he was Foreign Secretary, one thing that remains a permanent stain on his reputation (http://bigthink.com/ideas/40079 via Graham Linehan, @Glinner on Twitter). Nothing could furnish stronger material for reflections on the responsibilities and morality of power. If it's true, it is a mistake he can learn from, learn not to repeat, even in another form. Not in any way to excuse him if he was complicit in Rendition, but the exercise of Foreign Policy always involves those doing it in dubious transactions. To take an obvious example, everyone is obliged to deal with the Chinese Government, because the potential market is so huge, and their influence on world affairs ever on the rise. This despite their human rights record, about which they are completely unapologetic and have no intention of changing. Indeed, their continued existence as a Government relies partly precisely on that abuse of human rights. Robin Cook's 'Ethical Foreign Policy' was a dream, or more accurately an only partly realisable aspiration. The thing in Foreign Policy is not whether you are engaged in actions that are wrong, but how do you limit the extent of that engagement. This is not a cynical excuse for unfettered participation in any and all abuses. It is a recognition of reality and a call for restraint. Even having the most severely limited foreign policy ('Splendid Isolation') does not free you from contamination, for several reasons. The first is that you end up commiting sins of omission, as John Major and Douglas Hurd did over former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the early '90s. President Clinton has acknowledged his sorrow and shame over failing to act in the latter. The second is that States or foreign terrorists attack you anyway, regardless of your desire to keep well out of it. Think of the Axis Powers in the last '30s.
Aside from mulling over all that, going forward David M retains his skill as a communicator, but has a chance to discover his own more authentic voice, and his own true political identity to communicate. Again, an extremely extravagant comparison, but think of the political journey of Bobby Kennedy, another one of a set of brothers prominent in public life, over his lifetime. Because of where RFK ended up, we can forgive his origins as a hawkish Cold War warrior, among other things attacking Eisenhower during the 1960 presidential election for allowing the growth of the supposed 'missile gap' with the Soviet Union.
In sum what I am saying is, come back David, we need you !
Though whether our political-media system is mature enough to permit his re-emergence in the near future is another matter.
However any of the foregoing may be, one thing I can say with certainty is that we definitely have not heard the last of David Miliband.
Now though I find my opinion of David Miliband has modified, and for the following reason: what he has not done since losing the Labour leadership election. Now, a majority of voters in the Labour leadership contest did what members of Parties often do when they have just suffered a bruising defeat and been turfed out of office after a long spell in it. They elect a leader who suits them, who they feel comfortable with (in this case Ed M), not the one who would most effectively make their case to the wider electorate (here, David M). This is because the latter kind of leader is necessarily suspect to them; because that leader by definition has a wider view of things than the majority of his party members; in the case of the Labour Party, he or she would be 'too right-wing'. Remember how the Tories elected that succession of no-hopers after John Major, their very own Brezhnev-Andropov-Chernenko sequence. I've had to look up what exact order they came in to make sure, but in a sense it doesn't really matter: William Hague, Iain Duncan Smith for heaven's sake !, Michael Howard. This is the same process at work. These leaders were sufficiently right-wing to suit the taste of the Party and activists, but too right-wing for the electorate at large.
Now Ed Miliband, after a stumbling start, is turning out to be a better leader of Labour than I had anticipated. I think he still has great difficulty coming over naturally in tv interviews. But it is not Ed I am concerned with here, it is David.
Think what has not happened since the outcome of the leadership election. There have been no stories of splits or tension or disagreement over policy between David and Ed. There has been no sniping at Ed, no critical running commentary, no secret hostile briefing to journalists from himself or from 'friends'. David retired from the front-line with the professed aim of avoiding stories of splits, and as it turns out has really done so. He has kept his own counsel, and been prepared to let Ed make his own way unhindered. Now - think of the amount of mischief David could have caused if he had wanted to, the civil war he could at least have tried to ignite, based on pique and wounded vanity; motives common in political disputes. That he has not done so is to me testament to his restraint. I infer that he has not done so from the absence of stories of conflict he could have generated had he wished, in a media only too eager to receive and amplify them.
Which all leads me to a position I never thought I would hold. What I would like to see is David Miliband returning to front-line politics. Why ? Because he knows what he's on about when it comes to foreign affairs. At this time of great turmoil abroad, especially in the Middle East and North Africa, where our interests and sympathies are involved and we face all sorts of choices and temptations over if and how to intervene (or put negatively to meddle), we need his voice, his expertise, his advice.
I think the recent check in his career has done David M good. It is in times of adversity and enforced silence that true character is both developed and shown. Think of Teddy Roosevelt in the Dakota Territory after his wife and mother died, or Churchill in his wilderness years. Lofty comparisons perhaps, but something akin to what David is undergoing now; his forty days and nights in the Desert.
One thing David may wish to contemplate during this time is his alleged complicity in Extraordinary Rendition while he was Foreign Secretary, one thing that remains a permanent stain on his reputation (http://bigthink.com/ideas/40079 via Graham Linehan, @Glinner on Twitter). Nothing could furnish stronger material for reflections on the responsibilities and morality of power. If it's true, it is a mistake he can learn from, learn not to repeat, even in another form. Not in any way to excuse him if he was complicit in Rendition, but the exercise of Foreign Policy always involves those doing it in dubious transactions. To take an obvious example, everyone is obliged to deal with the Chinese Government, because the potential market is so huge, and their influence on world affairs ever on the rise. This despite their human rights record, about which they are completely unapologetic and have no intention of changing. Indeed, their continued existence as a Government relies partly precisely on that abuse of human rights. Robin Cook's 'Ethical Foreign Policy' was a dream, or more accurately an only partly realisable aspiration. The thing in Foreign Policy is not whether you are engaged in actions that are wrong, but how do you limit the extent of that engagement. This is not a cynical excuse for unfettered participation in any and all abuses. It is a recognition of reality and a call for restraint. Even having the most severely limited foreign policy ('Splendid Isolation') does not free you from contamination, for several reasons. The first is that you end up commiting sins of omission, as John Major and Douglas Hurd did over former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the early '90s. President Clinton has acknowledged his sorrow and shame over failing to act in the latter. The second is that States or foreign terrorists attack you anyway, regardless of your desire to keep well out of it. Think of the Axis Powers in the last '30s.
Aside from mulling over all that, going forward David M retains his skill as a communicator, but has a chance to discover his own more authentic voice, and his own true political identity to communicate. Again, an extremely extravagant comparison, but think of the political journey of Bobby Kennedy, another one of a set of brothers prominent in public life, over his lifetime. Because of where RFK ended up, we can forgive his origins as a hawkish Cold War warrior, among other things attacking Eisenhower during the 1960 presidential election for allowing the growth of the supposed 'missile gap' with the Soviet Union.
In sum what I am saying is, come back David, we need you !
Though whether our political-media system is mature enough to permit his re-emergence in the near future is another matter.
However any of the foregoing may be, one thing I can say with certainty is that we definitely have not heard the last of David Miliband.
Phone Hacking Latest
I was watching part of Tom Crone and Colin Myler appearing before the Culture, Media & Sport Select Committee earlier today. They were really floundering.
They came across as incredibly shifty and evasive. They were consistently giving rambling and irrelevant replies to perfectly straightforward questions. The substance of their defence of their actions was a variation on a familiar one: 'Decisions were made above us. We didn't know the full extent of what was going on'.
But the essence of the Murdochs' defence was: 'Decisions were made below us. We trusted our employees and we were betrayed'.
Everyone involved in the phone hacking scandal at The News of the World, including those from the Metropolitan Police, seems to think what had gone on and investigating it properly was someone else's responsibility. When questioned, they're all saying, 'I didn't know ... I didn't ask ...' When they're put on the spot and they might perjure themselves, they say, 'I don't recollect ... I don't remember ...' That old one !
Someone from News International and/or News Corporation must have, and therefore take, responsibility for the hacking and other illegal practices such as paying police for information, and the subsequent attempt to cover these things up.
They came across as incredibly shifty and evasive. They were consistently giving rambling and irrelevant replies to perfectly straightforward questions. The substance of their defence of their actions was a variation on a familiar one: 'Decisions were made above us. We didn't know the full extent of what was going on'.
But the essence of the Murdochs' defence was: 'Decisions were made below us. We trusted our employees and we were betrayed'.
Everyone involved in the phone hacking scandal at The News of the World, including those from the Metropolitan Police, seems to think what had gone on and investigating it properly was someone else's responsibility. When questioned, they're all saying, 'I didn't know ... I didn't ask ...' When they're put on the spot and they might perjure themselves, they say, 'I don't recollect ... I don't remember ...' That old one !
Someone from News International and/or News Corporation must have, and therefore take, responsibility for the hacking and other illegal practices such as paying police for information, and the subsequent attempt to cover these things up.
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