Thursday, 15 September 2011
The Hari Affair
After months of suspense, now we know the full extent of what Johann Hari is admitting to, and it is very serious indeed. (http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/johann-hari/johann-hari-a-personal-apology-2354679.html)
Firstly, there is inserting material silently from the books of people he was interviewing, in place of what they said in the actual interview. This is wrong but not appalling. I am puzzled as to why he didn't simply insert the material from elsewhere and just cite its origin.
Then there is the inserting in his published interviews of material from interviews done by other journalists without attribution. In other words, plagiarism. It is distinct from the practice described above, and inexcusable. With or without journalistic training. it is hard to understand how Hari thought this was an acceptable thing to do.
The final admission is by far the most serious. It is that he created a fictitious online identity - using a name which happens to be that of a Times journalist working at the moment, David Rose, with whom Hari went to university - with which he maliciously re-edited the wikipedia entires of 'people I had clashed with', as he puts it. This was done secretly, and more than once. It was not an isolated incident, not merely a single moment of anger or foolishness.
The allegation that he had done this has been around for some time. At first glance it seemed absurd: what could possess someone to do such a thing ? It is so childish - 'juvenile', as Hari himself writes. The gain is nothing, and the potential loss of reputation if discovered so immense. There are people online with the skills and patience to unmask anyone doing it, despite any attempt at concealment. A key point of the whole affair, and Hari admits something along these lines in his apology, is that if a right-wing journalist or commentator had done what Hari has done, he would have attacked them strongly for it, and with relish.
The Independent are backing Hari and he continues to be employed by them. The question for me is: whatever article he writes next, how will anyone take it seriously ? Will it not be greeted with derision ?
Finally, Hari refers in his apology to 'the most basic ethical rule: don't do to others what you don't want them to do to you.' That seems to me so tortuous a way of putting it that the meaning almost disappears. Here's a simpler way: 'Do as you would be done by.'
ADDENDUM: On reflection, I find Hari's apology even less satisfactory than I did at first, and am surprised that The Independent printed it as it is, or thought it was sufficient.
The only motive for silently inserting quotes from books by his interviewees in his finished pieces is to make his interviews seem better than they were. The reason Hari gives is a transparently inadequate rationalisation.
His defence that because he lacks proper journalistic training, he didn't realise plagiarism was wrong is absurd.
If you notice, the apology constantly seeks to minimise the offences by being deliberately vague about details. With each of the three misdemeanours, it is important to know the extent of it in order to judge its seriousness. In each case, how many times did he do it exactly, and over what period ? For instance, with the wiki-trolling: who precisely were the targets ? How many times did he interfere with their pages ? What alterations did he make ? Over what period of time did he do it ? Accurate answers to those questions are vital for the reader to determine his or her opinion of what took place.
All in all, Hari is trying to apologise without really doing so, and for some reason The Independent has allowed him to do it. Regarding either Hari or the paper, it won't do.
(By far the best reaction to all this I have seen is by Bagehot for The Economist: http://www.economist.com/blogs/bagehot/2011/09/unethical-journalism )
Wednesday, 14 September 2011
Why do the Unions go on funding Labour when the Party doesn't do exactly what they want ?
Tories love to taunt the Labour Party by saying that it is in hock to the Trade Unions. A more complicated version of this is to say that Labour is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Unions. But the people making these taunts know that they are not true. It is true that about 87% of Labour's funding does come from the Trade Unions (source: http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/may/25/labour-party-donors-unions). But Ed Miliband refused to back the strike action taken by four Unions in June this year, and reiterated that refusal in his speech to the TUC Congress yesterday, a position that was greeted by boos and heckling.
So given that the Unions are overwhelmingly Labour's main source of funding, why won't the leader of that party do exactly what they want, and why do they put up with it and go on funding the Party ?
The answers come if you consider their alternative. They are free to withdraw funding and therefore bankrupt and destroy Labour, and set up their own new Party whose policies would be under their complete control. The problem is, no one would vote for it, and they know this. Labour may not give the Unions everything they want, but they are a viable political party with a network of activists, historical roots and a base of support in the country, which can and have been translated into becoming the Government. Ed Miliband, or any Labour leader, may appear to hold a weak hand because of Labour's financial dependence on the Unions; but on the other hand he knows, and the Union leaders know, that the Labour Party is the best offer they are ever going to get in terms of meaningful access to power, and that effectively the Unions have nowhere else to go.
This explains what is otherwise a puzzle: why the Unions would go on supporting a Labour leader they were primarily responsible for installing who does not support them on strikes over what they regard as critical issues for their membership; and why they would go on funding the Party of which he is a head.
So given that the Unions are overwhelmingly Labour's main source of funding, why won't the leader of that party do exactly what they want, and why do they put up with it and go on funding the Party ?
The answers come if you consider their alternative. They are free to withdraw funding and therefore bankrupt and destroy Labour, and set up their own new Party whose policies would be under their complete control. The problem is, no one would vote for it, and they know this. Labour may not give the Unions everything they want, but they are a viable political party with a network of activists, historical roots and a base of support in the country, which can and have been translated into becoming the Government. Ed Miliband, or any Labour leader, may appear to hold a weak hand because of Labour's financial dependence on the Unions; but on the other hand he knows, and the Union leaders know, that the Labour Party is the best offer they are ever going to get in terms of meaningful access to power, and that effectively the Unions have nowhere else to go.
This explains what is otherwise a puzzle: why the Unions would go on supporting a Labour leader they were primarily responsible for installing who does not support them on strikes over what they regard as critical issues for their membership; and why they would go on funding the Party of which he is a head.
Monday, 12 September 2011
Invasion of Iraq 2003: A Hideous Mistake
"SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Was it then a weakness in the pre-March 2003 discussions that somehow voices weren't raised, and experts and knowledge weren't put on the table that there could be this massive deterioration [in the security situation in Iraq post-invasion] ?
RT HON TONY BLAIR: There was very much discussion of the Shia/Sunni issue, and we were very well aware of that. What there wasn't -- and this, again, is of vital importance and this certainly is a lesson in any situation similar to this -- people did not believe that you would have Al-Qaeda coming in from outside and people did not believe that you would end up in a situation where Iran, once, as it were, the threat of Saddam was removed from them, would then try to deliberately destabilise the country, but that's what they did, and there are some very important lessons in that ... "
- Tony Blair giving evidence at The Chilcot Enquiry, 29th January 2010, p.194 (http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/transcripts/oralevidence-bydate/100129.aspx)
"I mean the truth is what got really difficult, far more difficult than anyone imagined, was when you got external factors joining up with internal factors to try and cause chaos and instability; by use of terrorism, by suicide bombers, by, you know, roadside bombs ..."
- Tony Blair, referring to both Iraq & Afghanistan, interview for The Times, 9th September 2011, by Philip Webster & Richard Beeston (http://www.tonyblairoffice.org/news/entry/ten-years-after-9-11-the-battle-is-for-an-open-world-not-a-closed-one/)
How governments are run, whether in theory (the constitution) or practice (the given particular administration) may seem a tiresome detail of interest only to political nerds and policy wonks. But in fact it is vital because how decisions are made crucially shapes what decisions are made, and those decisions often have very wide consequences. The decision by the US and UK Governments , with support from only Australia and Poland, to invade Iraq in 2003 is a perfect illustration of this point.
In the events running up to the invasion of Iraq, one critical similarity between Tony Blair's government and the Bush Administration is that they were both run by tight cabals who were contemptuous of disagreement within their own wider governments. This was a key structural feature, in fact a weakness, in both governments which first made the decision to invade possible, and second for it to happen without any adequate plans for the aftermath. Dissent was marginalised; caveats and those raising them excluded. Furthermore, Blair's cabal was contemptuous of public opinion in Britain, which was generally at best puzzled by the need for or at worst actively hostile to the invasion. The Bush cabal meanwhile were contemptuous of international opinion.
Invading Iraq at all was a dumb decision. But the error was compounded a thousandfold by the incredible incompetence of how it was carried out, particularly the complete failure to plan properly or at all for what would happen once Saddam's forces had been defeated. Their planning did not go beyond 'We'll go in there with overwhelming force, we'll knock Saddam over, then everything will be alright.'
Tony Blair's contention, made in his evidence to the Chilcot Enquiry in 2010, that: a) everything would have been alright but for the interference of Al-Qaeda and more especially Iran; and b) that interference could not have been foreseen, are both ludicrous coming from an intelligent man. Such feeble reasoning merely highlights how indefensible the invasion was. I found it staggering in 2010, and do so now reading over it again, that Tony Blair was not ashamed publicly to reveal such a flawed and limitted understanding of the country he was proposing to invade, and of the dynamics of the region. He was the Prime Mininster of the United Kingdom. He cannot have lacked for experts. One can only presume he was not listening to them.No one knows or will ever know the number of Iraqis who have died in the internal conflicts since the invasion of 2003. Estimates, which is all there are, vary greatly. You can see some for yourself here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualties_of_the_Iraq_War. It is reasonable to say it is more than 100,000 people. The fact that we don't know is a kind of extra injury to the people of Iraq, and emphasises our recklessness in that country.
"I also think however that in the action in Libya we're able to learn from the experiences particularly in nation building in Afghanistan & Iraq, but we've also got to hope by the way that in Libya you don't get the same external forces as you got in Iraq particularly, and in Afghanistan, destabilising the situation. Now personally I'm pretty optimistic about that, I think there's every chance Libya will get on its feet, and that would be great ..."
- Tony Blair, 'The 9/11 Interview', with Jon Sopel, BBCNews, 10th September, 2011 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-14864513)
There is a constant implication in Tony Blair's remarks about the invasion of Iraq that I find infuriating. It is that the invasion itself took place in a kind of historical vacuum, in which none of what eventually happened could have been foreseen. In essence, saying that there had never been such a thing as a counter-insurgency campaign before and therefore there were no precedents or experience to help the invaders anticipate what might happen, they had to start from scratch. This is so obviously wrong that it is insulting, somewhat like Gordon Brown's claim that the banking disaster and credit crunch of 2007-8 came from nowhere and could not have been predicted. You have to have effectively no knowledge in order to believe either.
Here are a very few major counter-insurgencies that were available to serve as potential models, and provide warning of pitfalls:
British:
1. Malayan Emergency 1948-60
2. Aden Emergency 1963-67
3. Mau Mau Rebellion (Kenya) 1952-60, though this was a brutal & disgraceful campaign on our part.
4. EOKA in Cyprus 1955-9
French:
1. Indochina 1946-54
RT HON TONY BLAIR: There was very much discussion of the Shia/Sunni issue, and we were very well aware of that. What there wasn't -- and this, again, is of vital importance and this certainly is a lesson in any situation similar to this -- people did not believe that you would have Al-Qaeda coming in from outside and people did not believe that you would end up in a situation where Iran, once, as it were, the threat of Saddam was removed from them, would then try to deliberately destabilise the country, but that's what they did, and there are some very important lessons in that ... "
- Tony Blair giving evidence at The Chilcot Enquiry, 29th January 2010, p.194 (http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/transcripts/oralevidence-bydate/100129.aspx)
"I mean the truth is what got really difficult, far more difficult than anyone imagined, was when you got external factors joining up with internal factors to try and cause chaos and instability; by use of terrorism, by suicide bombers, by, you know, roadside bombs ..."
- Tony Blair, referring to both Iraq & Afghanistan, interview for The Times, 9th September 2011, by Philip Webster & Richard Beeston (http://www.tonyblairoffice.org/news/entry/ten-years-after-9-11-the-battle-is-for-an-open-world-not-a-closed-one/)
How governments are run, whether in theory (the constitution) or practice (the given particular administration) may seem a tiresome detail of interest only to political nerds and policy wonks. But in fact it is vital because how decisions are made crucially shapes what decisions are made, and those decisions often have very wide consequences. The decision by the US and UK Governments , with support from only Australia and Poland, to invade Iraq in 2003 is a perfect illustration of this point.
In the events running up to the invasion of Iraq, one critical similarity between Tony Blair's government and the Bush Administration is that they were both run by tight cabals who were contemptuous of disagreement within their own wider governments. This was a key structural feature, in fact a weakness, in both governments which first made the decision to invade possible, and second for it to happen without any adequate plans for the aftermath. Dissent was marginalised; caveats and those raising them excluded. Furthermore, Blair's cabal was contemptuous of public opinion in Britain, which was generally at best puzzled by the need for or at worst actively hostile to the invasion. The Bush cabal meanwhile were contemptuous of international opinion.
Invading Iraq at all was a dumb decision. But the error was compounded a thousandfold by the incredible incompetence of how it was carried out, particularly the complete failure to plan properly or at all for what would happen once Saddam's forces had been defeated. Their planning did not go beyond 'We'll go in there with overwhelming force, we'll knock Saddam over, then everything will be alright.'
Tony Blair's contention, made in his evidence to the Chilcot Enquiry in 2010, that: a) everything would have been alright but for the interference of Al-Qaeda and more especially Iran; and b) that interference could not have been foreseen, are both ludicrous coming from an intelligent man. Such feeble reasoning merely highlights how indefensible the invasion was. I found it staggering in 2010, and do so now reading over it again, that Tony Blair was not ashamed publicly to reveal such a flawed and limitted understanding of the country he was proposing to invade, and of the dynamics of the region. He was the Prime Mininster of the United Kingdom. He cannot have lacked for experts. One can only presume he was not listening to them.No one knows or will ever know the number of Iraqis who have died in the internal conflicts since the invasion of 2003. Estimates, which is all there are, vary greatly. You can see some for yourself here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualties_of_the_Iraq_War. It is reasonable to say it is more than 100,000 people. The fact that we don't know is a kind of extra injury to the people of Iraq, and emphasises our recklessness in that country.
"I also think however that in the action in Libya we're able to learn from the experiences particularly in nation building in Afghanistan & Iraq, but we've also got to hope by the way that in Libya you don't get the same external forces as you got in Iraq particularly, and in Afghanistan, destabilising the situation. Now personally I'm pretty optimistic about that, I think there's every chance Libya will get on its feet, and that would be great ..."
- Tony Blair, 'The 9/11 Interview', with Jon Sopel, BBCNews, 10th September, 2011 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-14864513)
There is a constant implication in Tony Blair's remarks about the invasion of Iraq that I find infuriating. It is that the invasion itself took place in a kind of historical vacuum, in which none of what eventually happened could have been foreseen. In essence, saying that there had never been such a thing as a counter-insurgency campaign before and therefore there were no precedents or experience to help the invaders anticipate what might happen, they had to start from scratch. This is so obviously wrong that it is insulting, somewhat like Gordon Brown's claim that the banking disaster and credit crunch of 2007-8 came from nowhere and could not have been predicted. You have to have effectively no knowledge in order to believe either.
Here are a very few major counter-insurgencies that were available to serve as potential models, and provide warning of pitfalls:
British:
1. Malayan Emergency 1948-60
2. Aden Emergency 1963-67
3. Mau Mau Rebellion (Kenya) 1952-60, though this was a brutal & disgraceful campaign on our part.
4. EOKA in Cyprus 1955-9
French:
1. Indochina 1946-54
2. Algeria 1954-62
That's just for 2 countries fighting them in only a 20 year period and post-WWII. I'm labouring the point. There are innumerable examples. A two minute search on Google using the term 'Counter-insurgency' will start you off and direct you to all you need to know.
That's just for 2 countries fighting them in only a 20 year period and post-WWII. I'm labouring the point. There are innumerable examples. A two minute search on Google using the term 'Counter-insurgency' will start you off and direct you to all you need to know.
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